Documentation is being increasingly computer based. It's easier to make, search, and review.
I'm sure that these items needed to be reviewed and updated by the front line soldiers involved with the situations. Thus, they gave all front line soldiers the same basic access. It was too cumbersome to limit access by individual soldier, so they probably limited access defined by their role on the battle field.
This would open up a lot of front line information up to everyone on the front line who has time to look.
Security restrictions take an immense amount of time to administer properly if you want to keep refined groups of people out. It takes almost no time at all to grant permissions to large groups of people and it makes the user's life easier. I should know, it's my job to advise people on these matters. I'm over-simplifying here, but hopefully my point gets across.
That is what compartmentalization is supposed to control. And somebody failed at the vetting.The problem with "access" generally speaking, is it makes it very easy to get ahold of more stuff you may no strictly be supposed to be authorized for. Maybe not necessarily what you are using or handling in your job, but it's there. That will probably be one aspect of the charges he faces: unauthorized access.
For example, he may have had the combination to a safe where the report he worked on was stored in the 1st drawer, and that's all he was supopsed to be dealing with. Maybe there was tons of raw intel in the 2nd drawer the more senior analysts were working on, which he helped himself to when nobody was looking.
Just a WAG.
The guy was an analyst, so he had access. Access, generally speaking, is very strictly controlled. But once you have access, you may have access to vast amounts of information.
the MOS title has analyst in it
Intelligence Analyst (35F)
I find it amazing that our POS president could not have held a security clearance base on his associations.