In the '60's, the SCOTUS decided that when private property owners accept "the public" on their property, they could not prevent "the public" from the exercise of their constitutional rights as a condition of entry of those premises (Black people have the right to come and go, eat, drink,...etc, where they like, in areas set aside for public use, and the owners of those properties cannot keep them out.
Thus ended "separate but equal" bathrooms, restaurants, schools, etc. The government decided then, that property owners rights were not absolute. They made their bed then, they should have to lie in it now (carry permit reciprocity.")
Not true. The Supreme Court ruled that the Commerce Clause was sufficient authority for congress to enact laws prohibiting discrimination. Absent the Commerce Clause, congress would be powerless to require equal protection in non-government activities, and the Constitution itself would provide no individual rights in non-government activities.
In 1946 the Supreme Court had adopted a "qausi-public places" doctrine in Marsh v. Alabama, but since that time the court restricted and then eventually reversed the quasi-public places doctrine:
Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)
Respondents sought to distribute handbills in the interior mall area of petitioner's large privately owned shopping center. Petitioner had a strict no-handbilling rule.
Petitioner's security guards requested respondents under threat of arrest to stop the handbilling, suggesting that they could resume their activities on the public streets and sidewalks adjacent to but outside the center, which respondents did.
Respondents, claiming that petitioner's action violated their First Amendment rights, thereafter brought this action for injunctive and declaratory relief.
The District Court, stressing that the center is "open to the general public" and "the functional equivalent of a public business district," and relying on Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, and Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308, held that petitioner's policy of prohibiting handbilling within the mall violated respondents' First Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: There has been no dedication of petitioner's privately owned and operated shopping center to public use so as to entitle respondents to exercise First Amendment rights therein that are unrelated to the center's operations, and petitioner's property did not lose its private character and its right to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the public is generally invited to use it for the purpose of doing business with petitioner's tenants.
The facts in this case are significantly different from those in Marsh, supra, which involved a company town with "all the attributes" of a municipality, and Logan Valley, supra, which involved labor picketing designed to convey a message to patrons of a particular store, so located in the center of a large private enclave as to preclude other reasonable access to store patrons. Under the circumstances present in this case, where the handbilling was unrelated to any activity within the center and where respondents had adequate alternative means of communication, the courts below erred in holding those decisions controlling.